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specific	 measures	 to	 support	 green	 technologies.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 look	 at	 the	 very	
generous	 subsidy	 policies	 to	 solar	 PVs	 in	 the	 three	 regions	 of	 Belgium	 to	 ask	 the	
question	of	how	voters	responded	to	these	programs.	We	provide	evidence	that	voters	
did	 not	 reward	 the	 incumbent	 government	 that	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 program,	 as	
predicted	 by	 the	 ‘buying-votes’	 hypothesis.	 Instead,	 we	 find	 that	 voters	 punish	 the	
incumbent	government	because	of	the	increasing	awareness	of	the	high	financing	costs.	




























































However,	 there	 is	 much	 less	 consensus	 on	 the	 type	 of	 policies	 that	 are	 required	 to	
reduce	 CO2	 emissions.	 Economists	 often	 favour	 Pigouvian	 taxes	 on	 CO2	 emissions	 to	
correct	for	the	externalities.1	But	such	taxes	may	not	be	politically	feasible	for	a	variety	
of	 reasons:	 distributional	 concerns,	 industry	 pressure,	 aversion	 to	 taxes,	 lack	 of	
coordination,	or	fiscal	competition	between	countries	(see	e.g.	Fowlie,	2019).	As	a	result,	
politicians	 have	 often	 favored	 a	 variety	 of	 subsidy	 programs	 to	 promote	 specific	
renewable	energy	sources	(RES),	such	as	solar,	wind	or	biofuel,	and	more	generally	 to	
support	 the	 adoption	 of	 green	 technologies.	 Governments	 have	 used	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
instruments,	including	tax	incentives,	investment	subsidies	and	production	subsidies.			
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 aim	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 political	 economy	 that	 lies	 behind	
technology-specific	 subsidies.	 We	 exploit	 the	 unique	 setting	 of	 the	 generous	 subsidy	
programs	 to	 solar	 photovoltaic	 (PV)	 systems	 in	 Belgium.	 Each	 of	 the	 country’s	 three	
regions	 adopted	 similar	 policies,	 consisting	 of	 a	 combination	 of	 rebates	 of	 part	 of	 the	
investment	costs	and	subsidies	on	green	electricity	production.	Because	policies	 led	to	
massive	 adoption,	 two	 of	 the	 three	 regions	 also	 needed	 to	 cope	 with	 comparable	
financing	 problems,	 and	 it	 led	 to	 continuous	 political	 debate.	 The	main	 policies	were	
designed	during	the	period	2004-2009	by	the	regional	governments,	which	at	that	time	
were	center	or	center-left	coalitions	in	the	three	regions.	Because	the	regions	differed	in	




non-adopters	modified	 their	 vote	 to	 eventually	 reward	 or	 punish	 the	 politicians	who	
designed	these	programs.					
Our	analysis	consists	of	different	parts.	First,	we	describe	the	various	types	of	subsidy	
programs	 that	 have	 been	 introduced.	 An	 important	 feature	 of	 our	 setting	 is	 that	 the	
programs	quickly	 shifted	 away	 from	 rebates	 to	 future	production	 subsidies	under	 the	
form	 of	 Green	 Certificates	 (GCs)	 and	 net-metering.2	Under	 net	 metering,	 the	 energy	
produced	 by	 the	 solar	 panels	 is	 valued	 at	 the	 retail	 price,	 including	 all	 taxes	 and	
surcharges.	 	 With	 a	 mechanical	 meter	 (the	 most	 common	 metering	 technology	 in	
Belgium	in	the	absence	of	smart	meters),	net	metering	is	simply	implemented	by	having	
the	 meter	 running	 backwards	 when	 the	 solar	 production	 exceeds	 the	 house’s	
consumption.	 	This	shift	to	production	subsidies,	granted	for	long	periods,	 implies	that	
the	 financing	 of	 the	 programs	 is	 postponed	 to	 the	 future	 and	 current	 technology	




1	See,	 for	 example,	 the	 Economists’	 Statement	 on	 Carbon	 Dividends	 (https://clcouncil.org/economists-







of	 the	 generous	 GCs.	 Third,	 given	 the	 magnitude	 and	 success	 of	 the	 GC	 system	 to	
promote	 adoption,	 the	 financing	 of	 the	 program	 became	 critical,	 leading	 to	 intense	
political	 debate	 and	 discussions.	 	 These	 financing	 issues	 raised	 important	
redistributional	 concerns.	 A	 central	 question	 was	 who	 should	 pay	 for	 the	 generous	
subsidies:	technology	adopters	or	non	adopters;	and	current	or	future	consumers?	The	
financing	of	these	costs	was	one	of	the	most	important	and	contentious	debates	during	
the	 last	years,	both	 in	Flanders	and	in	Wallonia.	 	 	This	brings	us	to	our	main	question.		
We	 ask	 how	 voters	 responded	 to	 the	 subsidy	 program	 in	 the	 regional	 election	 years	




voting	 for	 the	 responsible	 parties.	 This	 is	 the	 ‘buying	 votes’	 hypothesis,	 according	 to	
which	 governments	 will	 implement	 certain	 policies	 to	 buy	 votes	 from	 the	 current	
beneficiaries	of	the	subsidies	(Biais	and	Perotti,	2002	and	Ovaere	and	Proost,	2015).	A	
second	hypothesis	 is	 that	 voters	do	not	 reward	 the	parties	 that	were	 responsible,	 but	
instead	reward	the	green	parties	whose	political	program	has	always	focused	on	climate	
policy.	 	 Comin	 and	 Rode	 (2013)	 document	 such	 a	 green	 effect	 in	 Germany.	 	 A	 third	
hypothesis	is	that	voters	who	did	not	benefit	from	the	subsidies	(i.e.	the	non-adopters)	
punish	 the	government	 if	 it	becomes	apparent	 that	 they	end	up	paying	a	considerable	





election	 outcomes	 of	 the	 incumbent	 parties	 (i.e.	 the	 center	 or	 center-left	 parties	 that	
designed	 the	 programs)	 at	 the	 local	 market	 level	 (municipality)	 during	 the	 regional	
election	years	2009,	2014	and	2019,	in	comparison	with	the	pre-program	election	years	
1995,	 1999	 and	 2004.	 We	 ask	 whether	 the	 election	 outcomes	 were	 more	 or	 less	
favorable	to	the	incumbent	parties	in	those	local	markets	where	solar	PV	adoption	had	
been	higher.	The	idea	is	that	in	such	markets	there	is	a	higher	awareness	of	the	various	
effects	 of	 the	 policies	 (to	 both	 adopters	 and	 non-adopters).	 Since	we	 control	 for	 both	
local	market	effects	and	election	time	effects	(including	previous	regional	elections),	our	
model	may	be	interpreted	as	a	difference-in-difference	framework.		
Our	main	 finding	 is	 that	 the	 incumbent	 parties	 received	 fewer	 votes	 in	 local	markets	
where	PV	adoption	had	been	more	successful.	This	is	inconsistent	with	the	buying	votes	
hypothesis,	according	to	which	voters	reward	the	 incumbent	parties.	Adopters	did	not	
reward	 the	 politicians	 who	 designed	 the	 generous	 subsidy	 programs.	 	 	 Instead,	 our	
finding	 is	 consistent	with	 our	 alternative	 hypothesis	 that	 voters	who	 did	 not	 directly	
benefit	from	the	programs	punish	the	incumbent	parties,	once	it	became	apparent	that	
the	financing	costs	would	be	high	and	be	paid	to	a	large	extent	by	non-beneficiaries.		We	
also	 find	 that	 the	punishment	 tends	 to	be	more	severe	 in	Flanders,	where	most	of	 the	
costs	had	already	been	passed	on	to	consumers	through	substantially	higher	electricity	
prices.	
We	extend	 the	analysis	 to	 consider	which	political	parties	were	most	affected.	Among	
the	 incumbent	 parties,	we	 find	 that	mainly	 the	 left	 (and	 not	 the	 center)	 parties	were	
negatively	affected.	This	is	intuitive	as	they	were	also	most	associated	with	the	policies	
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in	 the	public	debate.	 Furthermore,	 the	parties	 that	benefited	and	 received	more	votes	







provided	 by	 combining	 different	 instruments:	 investment	 subsidies,	 tax	 credits,	 net	











The	 literature	has	estimated	 the	 impact	of	different	subsidy	programs	on	PV	adoption	
and	 compared	 the	 relative	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 policy	 instruments.	 	 	 Hughes	 and	
Podolefsky	(2015)	focus	on	the	impact	of	investment	subsides	on	adoption	in	California.	
Matisoff	 and	 Johnson	 (2017)	and	Gautier	 and	 Jacqmin	 (2020)	 focus	on	 the	 role	of	net	
metering	policies.	 	Crago	and	Chernyakhovskiy	(2016)	show	that	 investment	subsidies	
have	relatively	more	 impact	than	factors	affecting	future	benefits	 like	energy	prices	or	
solar	 irradiation.	 	De	Groote	and	Verboven	 (2019)	 show	 that	households	discount	 the	
future	 benefits	 heavily	 and	 confirm	 that	 investment	 subsidies	 are	more	 effective	 than	
production	subsidies	to	promote	PV	adoption.			Using	detailed	data	at	the	individual	or	
at	 the	 district	 level,	 Vasseur	 and	 Kemp	 (2015)	 and	De	 Groote	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 study	 the	
various	factors	driving	PV	adoption.	
Subsidies	 for	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 do	 not	 only	 promote	 investments	 in	 green	
technologies	but	they	also	have	redistributive	aspects.			For	this	reason,	it	is	important	to	
study	 how	 they	 are	 determined	 by	 the	 political	 process.	 	 The	 literature	 studied	 two	
different	issues.		First,	the	lobbying	by	interest	groups	for	or	against	energy	policies.		For	
instance,	Aidt	(1998)	studies	 the	structure	of	environmental	 taxes	under	 lobbying	and	
Jenner	et	al.	(2013)	show	that	energy	producers	from	conventional	sources	are	actively	
and	successfully	lobbying	against	subsidies	for	energy	from	renewable	sources.		Second,	





PVs.	 	 	Their	model	explains	why	politicians	prefer	 inefficiently	high	subsidies	 for	solar	
relative	to	wind	because	the	solar	subsidies	are	paid	to	households	(voters)	while	wind	







PV	 installations.	 Section	 3	 presents	 evidence	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 programs	 on	 PV	
adoption.	 Section	 4	 discusses	 the	 financing	 issues	 and	 political	 debate	 following	 the	





types	 of	measures	 that	were	 used	 to	 promote	 residential	 solar	 PV	 installations	 in	 the	
three	 regions	 of	 Belgium	 (section	 2.1).	 Next,	 we	 describe	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	
magnitudes	of	the	support	mechanisms	over	time	(section	2.2).	
Belgium	is	a	 federal	state	composed	of	 three	regions:	Flanders,	Wallonia	and	Brussels.		
The	 electricity	 market	 is	 fully	 liberalized	 since	 2007.	 Production	 and	 retailing	 are	
competitive	activities,	while	transport	and	distribution	remain	organized	as	a	regulated	
monopoly.	 	Transport	(high	voltage	grid)	 is	regulated	at	the	federal	 level	by	the	CREG,	
the	national	regulator.	The	national	transport	system	operator	(TSO)	is	Elia.	Distribution	
(low	 voltage	 grid)	 is	 regulated	 by	 the	 regional	 energy	 regulators:	 VREG	 in	 Flanders,	




its	 own	 policy	 to	 support	 solar	 energy.	 We	 will	 focus	 our	 analysis	 on	 the	 generous	
programs	 for	 residential	 PV	 installations. 3 	All	 regions	 have	 combined	 the	 same	
instruments	 but	 they	 differ	 in	 both	 the	 magnitude	 and	 the	 timing	 of	 their	 support	
measures.	We	provide	an	overview	of	the	most	important	measures	below.	Appendix	1	
lists	the	sources	we	used	to	write	this	overview,	as	well	as	the	data	and	assumptions	to	
calculate	each	component	of	 the	costs	and	benefits	of	adoption	that	we	will	use	 in	 the	
rest	of	this	paper.	
2.1 Types	of	subsidy	programs	
The	 supporting	 schemes	 combine	 three	 types	of	measures:	 rebates	on	 the	 investment	
costs,	 production	 subsidies	 through	 Green	 Certificates	 (GCs)	 and	 net	 metering.	 The	
support	schemes	have	been	gradually	phased	out,	starting	with	rebates	 for	part	of	 the	
investment	 cost	 (which	 existed	 for	 only	 a	 short	 period),	 and	 followed	 by	 the	 GCs,	
suppressed	 in	2014	 in	Flanders	 and	 in	2018	 in	Wallonia	but	 still	 in	place	 in	Brussels.	
Finally,	 the	 net	 metering	 system	will	 no	 longer	 be	 used	 in	 Brussels	 (2020),	 Flanders	
(2021)	and	Wallonia	(2023).			
																																																								
3	Flanders	and	Wallonia	also	had	programs	 for	commercial	PV	 installations,	which	usually	have	a	 larger	














Already	 before	 providing	 specific	 support	 to	 solar	 PVs,	 the	 three	 regions	 had	
implemented	 a	 general	 system	 of	 green	 certificates	 to	 support	 renewable	 energy	
sources	 (RES),	 such	as	wind,	 solar	 and	biomass.	The	green	 certificates	 are	production	
subsidies.	 They	 are	 awarded	 for	 the	 production	 of	 energy	 from	 certified	 renewable	
sources.	 	 During	 a	 given	 granting	 period	 (t),	 producers	 of	 green	 energy	 receive	 n	




quota	 obligations,	 the	 retailers	 can	 buy	 certificates	 from	 producers.	 They	 can	 pass	
through	 the	 cost	 of	 these	 obligations	 to	 end-consumers.	 On	 the	 GC	market,	 there	 is	 a	




In	 Flanders,	 for	 the	 residential	 PV	 installations	 connected	 to	 the	 low	 voltage	 grid,	 the	
default	 buyers	 are	 the	 publicly-owned	 DSOs	 and	 the	 minimum	 price	 (p)	 depends	 on	




the	 rooftop	 by	 the	 households,	 which	 were	 not	 profitable	 under	 the	 current	 GC	
mechanism	 in	 place.	 	 To	 that	 end,	 the	GC	mechanism	was	modified	 for	 residential	 PV	
installations	 of	 less	 than	10	kWp.	 	These	 specific	 supports	 consisted	of	 two	 elements:	
first,	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 granting	 period	 of	 GCs	 for	 residential	 PVs;	 and,	 second,	 an	
increase	 in	the	production	support	per	MWh	produced.	 	 In	Wallonia	and	Brussels,	 this	
was	 done	 by	 increasing	 the	 granting	 rate	 (n)	 above	 one	 GC	 per	 MWh	 produced.	 In	







to	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 mechanism	 (n,	 p	 and	 t),	 regardless	 of	 the	 rapidly	 changing	
	 9	
market	conditions.	In	both	regions,	the	generous	initial	support	combined	with	rapidly	





The	 idea	was	 that,	 instead	of	 committing	 to	 some	 specific	 values	 of	 n,	 p	 and	 t	 for	 the	
whole	 life	of	 the	PV	 installation,	 the	supporting	schemes	would	guarantee	a	 return	on	
investment	 and	 the	 parameters	 defining	 the	 subsidy	 scheme	 would	 adapt	 to	 market	
conditions.		Importantly,	these	changes	only	applied	to	new	installations.		
As	a	result,	the	system	of	GCs	was	adapted	and	gradually	phased	out.	Flanders	no	longer	
offers	GCs	 to	 residential	PV	 installations	 since	 July	2014.	 	 In	Wallonia,	 from	2014,	 the	
GCs	 were	 replaced	 by	 an	 annual	 premium	 paid	 by	 the	 DSOs	 during	 five	 years.	 	 The	
premium	 was	 based	 on	 the	 installation’s	 capacity	 and	 it	 was	 capped	 (to	 a	 level	
corresponding	 to	 a	 capacity	of	3	kWp).	 	The	amount	was	 revised	every	 six	months	 to	
take	 into	account	 the	changes	 in	 the	market	conditions.	The	capacity	premium	system	
was	eventually	abolished	in	Wallonia	in	July	2018.		The	region	of	Brussels	continues	to	
offer	GCs	at	a	rate	of	n=3	GCs	per	MWh	produced		.	








to	 cover	 consumption)	 and	 the	 energy	 exported	 to	 the	 grid	 (when	 solar	 production	
exceeds	 consumption)	 are	 valued	 at	 the	 same	 price4.	 The	 grid	 thus	 acts	 as	 a	 giant	
storage	facility,	where	households	are	‘prosumers’	and	can	store	their	excess	production	
for	later	consumption.	There	is,	however,	a	limit	to	that.	At	the	end	of	the	billing	period,	
usually	 one	 year,	 any	 excess	 production	 is	 ‘lost’,	 i.e.	 the	 household	 does	 not	 receive	
payment	 for	 this	 production.	 For	 a	 household	with	 excess	 production,	 the	 volumetric	
part	 of	 the	 bill	 is	 thus	 equal	 to	 zero.	 In	 sum,	 net	 metering	 acts	 like	 an	 additional	
production	 subsidy,	 equal	 to	 the	 volumetric	 retail	 electricity	 price,	 multiplied	 by	 the	
annual	 electricity	 production	 (or	 consumption	 if	 the	 annual	 production	 exceeds	 the	
annual	consumption).	
This	benefit	is	particularly	important	because	the	tariff	structure	in	the	three	regions	of	
Belgium	 is	essentially	volumetric,	 i.e.	based	on	 the	recorded	consumption	 in	kWh.	For	
the	 prosumers,	 it	 means	 that	 their	 bill	 is	 based	 on	 their	 annual	 net	 consumption	
(consumption	minus	solar	production),	and	it	is	almost	zero	if	production	is	sufficient	to	
cover	consumption	over	the	year.	Therefore,	the	contribution	of	prosumers	to	the	grid	
costs	 has	 shrunk.	 To	 correct	 that,	 regulators	 have	 modified	 the	 tariff	 structure	 to	
introduce	 a	 prosumer	 fee,	which	 is	 a	 contribution	 of	 the	 prosumers	 to	 the	 grid	 costs.			





Flanders	 and	 in	 October	 2020	 in	 Wallonia.5	Brussels	 instead	 has	 abandoned	 the	 net	
metering	system	in	2020	for	all	installations,	including	those	installed	before	2020.	
2.2 Evolution	of	the	magnitude	of	the	programs	
We	 collected	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	 timing	 and	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 different	
support	 schemes	 in	 the	 three	 regions.	 Based	 on	 that,	 we	 compute	 the	 various	
components	of	the	net	present	value:	𝑁𝑃𝑉!"# .	We	distinguish	between	five	capacity	sizes	
of	 PV:	𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5	(with	 corresponding	 capacities	 2,	 4,	 6,	 8	 and	 10	 kW),	 the	 region	
𝑐 = 𝐹,𝑊,𝐵	(Flanders,	 Wallonia	 and	 Brussels)	 and	 the	 month	𝑡	(time	 frame:	 January	
2006-December	2016).	












𝑏!"# = 𝑏!"#!"#$%" + 𝑏!"!"#$%! + 𝑏!"#!"#$"#"% + 𝑏!"#!" .	
Most	of	 these	benefits	 apply	over	 future	periods,	 and	we	calculate	 their	present	value	
using	an	annual	interest	rate	of	𝑟 = 3%.	This	corresponds	to	a	monthly	discount	factor	













MWh/kWp/month,	which	 corresponds	 to	a	 capacity	 factor	of	9.73%.6	We	also	assume	
























at	 the	 installation	 date,	 such	 a	 fee	 was	 not	 yet	 in	 place,	 we	 assume	 people	 did	 not	
anticipate	it,	i.e.	𝑏!"#
!"#$_!"" = 0.7	Finally,	the	adjusted	monthly	discount	factor	𝛿 ! 	is	given	
by	 𝛿 ! = (1− 𝜆)(1+ 𝜅)𝛿 ,	 where	 𝜅 	denotes	 the	 expected	 percentage	 increase	 in	











of	 periods	 that	 the	 GCs	 are	 guaranteed.	 	 The	monthly	 benefits	𝑏!̃"#
!" 	stem	 from	 the	 GC	
price.	 In	 Flanders,	 we	 simply	 use	 the	 fixed	 price	 of	 the	 GCs	 applicable	 at	 the	 time	 of	
adoption	𝑡.	In	Wallonia	and	Brussels,	the	GC	price	is	market	based,	so	we	have	to	make	
an	estimate	of	the	price:	we	take	it	to	be	equal	to	the	expected	price	at	the	moment	of	
adoption	 for	 the	 entire	 period	𝑅!! .	 	 The	 adjusted	 monthly	 discount	 factor	𝛿!"! 	is	 also	
region-specific.	 In	 Flanders	 (𝑐 = 𝐹) ,	 we	 set	𝛿!"#!  = (1− 𝜆)(1− 𝜋)𝛿 		 where	𝜋 	is	 the	
monthly	inflation	rate	(set	to	a	yearly	rate	of	2%),	to	capture	the	fact	that	the	model	is	in	
real	 prices	 while	 GC	 benefits	 were	 guaranteed	 at	 nominal	 prices.	 We	 use	 the	 same	
specification	for	Brussels	(𝛿!"#! )	and	Wallonia	(𝛿!"#! )	until	the	reform	of	March	2014.	We	





𝑏!"!"#$%! ,	 𝑏!"#!"#$"#"% 	and	 𝑏!"#!" ,	 are	 measured	 in	 present	 value	 terms	 based	 on	 the	
methodology	 of	 section	 2.2.1	 (shaded	 areas).	 They	 are	 compared	 with	 the	 upfront	
investment	price	 (black	 line).	According	 to	Figure	1,	 the	upfront	 investment	price	has	
been	continuously		declining.8	














An	 increasing	 electricity	 price	 made	 the	 net	 metering	 benefits	 increase	 steadily	 over	
time,	 except	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 grid	 fee	 in	 Flanders	 in	 2015.	 Because	 of	 the	






Figure	 2	 directly	 compares	 the	 regional	 evolution	 of	 the	 net	 present	 value,	 i.e.	 the	
difference	 between	 the	 present	 value	 of	 the	 future	 benefits	 and	 the	 investment	 price	
(𝑁𝑃𝑉!"# = 𝑏!"# − 𝑝!").	It	again	considers	a	4	kWp	system.	In	Flanders	(blue	line)	the	NPV	
was	 immediately	 positive	 with	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 generous	 GC	 policy.	 It	 then	
further	increased	when	investment	costs	went	down	(gradually)	and	the	federal	tax	cut	












the	 three	 regions,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 showing	 a	 comparable	 emphasis	 on	 production	
subsidies	in	the	form	of	GCs	and	net	metering,	with	a	faster	fade-out	of	the	GCs.	But	the	
timing	and	the	magnitudes	differed.	Flanders	started	off	earlier	at	very	generous	levels,	




How	 did	 the	 generous	 subsidy	 programs	 affect	 the	 adoption	 of	 solar	 PVs?	 Before	
addressing	 this	 question	 in	 further	 detail,	 it	 is	 informative	 to	 have	 a	 first	 look	 at	 the	
aggregate	 numbers	 for	 the	 three	 regions.	 Figure	 3	 shows	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 total	
adoption	rate,	 i.e.	 the	cumulative	number	of	PV	 installations	divided	by	the	number	of	
households.9	The	total	adoption	rate	has	grown	sharply	in	both	Flanders	and	Wallonia,	




when	 the	generous	GC	 system	was	phased	out.	After	 that,	 the	adoption	 rate	gradually	
started	to	grow	again,	especially	in	Flanders.	This	is	consistent	with	the	recent	evolution	
in	 the	NPV.	While	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 grid	 fee	 in	 Flanders	 lowered	 it	 initially,	 the	
increase	 in	electricity	prices	quickly	made	up	for	this.	 In	Wallonia,	 the	 lower	observed	















the	 households.	 	 We	 indeed	 observe	 kinks	 in	 the	 curves,	 especially	 in	 Flanders,	
corresponding	 to	 announced	 drops	 in	 GC	 subsidies.	 	 Prospective	 adopters	 anticipated	
their	investments	to	benefit	from	the	most	generous	PV	subsidies,	leading	to	spikes	and	
drops	in	adoption	just	before	and	after	a	policy	change.		
In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 section,	we	 explore	 in	more	detail	 how	 the	programs	have	 affected	
adoption.	 In	 subsection	 3.1	 we	 estimate	 a	 descriptive	 model	 that	 explains	 how	
differences	 in	 adoption	 across	 the	 regions	 can	 (partly)	 be	 attributed	 to	 differing	 local	
market	demographics	(e.g.	urbanized	areas	such	as	most	of	the	Brussels	region	are	less	
suited	 for	 rooftop	 PV	 modules).	 We	 estimate	 the	 model	 at	 the	 yearly	 level,	 to	 also	
investigate	the	impact	of	the	main	changes	in	financial	incentives.	In	subsection	3.2,	we	
explore	 the	 role	 of	 financial	 incentives	 in	 more	 depth.	 We	 use	 a	 dynamic	 model	 of	
technology	adoption,	where	households	 trade	off	upfront	costs	against	 future	benefits,	
while	taking	into	account	future	investment	opportunities.	In	the	next	section	4,	we	then	
discuss	 how	 the	massive	 adoption	 has	 imposed	 strong	 financing	 challenges	 given	 the	
generosity	of	the	system.	
3.1 The	determinants	of	PV	adoption:	a	descriptive	approach	





set	 of	 local	 municipalities	𝑚	and	 years	𝑡.	 We	 observe	 this	 information	 for	 11	 years	
(2006-2016)	for	each	of	the	589	municipalities	of	Belgium,	of	which	308	are	located	in	
Flanders	 (region	𝑐 = 𝐹),	 262	 in	 Wallonia	 (𝑐 =𝑊),	 and	 the	 remaining	 19	 in	 Brussels	
(𝑐 = 𝐵).	 The	 local	 determinants	 of	 adoption,	𝑥! ,	 are	 time-invariant	 socioeconomic	
variables	 (retrieved	 for	2011):	 the	number	of	households,	population	density,	 income,	





We	 observe	 large	 time	 and	 cross-sectional	 variation.	 Figure	 3	 showed	 that	 adoption	









𝐓𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝟏:  𝐃𝐞𝐬𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬	
     		 Mean	 Sd	 Min	 Max	
	     PV	adoptions	(count	by	year)	 61.646	 100.366	 0	 1,484	
	     log(households)	 8.515	 0.893	 3.555	 12.358	
Log(population	density)	 5.733	 1.158	 3.215	 10.100	
Income	group	2	 0.200	 0.400	 0	 1	
Income	group	3	 0.200	 0.400	 0	 1	
Income	group	4	 0.200	 0.400	 0	 1	
Income	group	5	 0.200	 0.400	 0	 1	
%	home	owned	 0.731	 0.096	 0.252	 0.911	
%	higher	education	 0.308	 0.076	 0.127	 0.592	
%	male	 0.493	 0.009	 0.454	 0.553	
%	foreign	 0.068	 0.074	 0.009	 0.497	
Average	household	size	 2.410	 0.146	 1.658	 2.802	
Average	year	of	construction	 1,962.502	 11.121	 1,931.096	 1,982.188	
Number	of	rooms	 5.867	 0.400	 4.202	 7.184	
	     Wallonia	 0.445	 0.497	 0.000	 1.000	
Brussels	 0.032	 0.177	 0.000	 1.000	
GC	(in	1000	EUR)	 11.199	 8.495	 0.000	 23.502	
		 		 		 		 		
Total	of	6,479	observations	(589	municipalities	x	11	years).	
	   
Similar	to	De	Groote,	Pepermans	and	Verboven	(2016),	we	assume	that	the	number	of	
new	PV	adopters,	𝑃𝑉!" ,	has	an	exponential	conditional	mean	function:	
𝐸 𝑃𝑉!" |𝑥!, 𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑏!"!" = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑥!𝛽 + 𝛾!𝑏!"!" + 𝐹𝐸! + 𝐹𝐸! ,	
where	𝐹𝐸! 	represents	 region	 fixed	 effects,	 and	𝐹𝐸! 	captures	 a	 full	 set	 of	 year	 fixed	
effects,	 so	 the	 impact	of	 the	GC	benefit	 variable	𝑏!"!" 	is	 identified	 from	variation	 that	 is	










		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Base	 Demographics	 GC	 Remove	early	
	
   years	
		 		 		 		 		
log(households)	 0.633***	 0.987***	 0.987***	 0.987***	
	





























































	     Wallonia	 -0.346***	 0.258***	 0.563***	 0.627***	
	
(0.034)	 (0.047)	 (0.050)	 (0.052)	
Brussels	 -2.463***	 -0.920***	 -1.857***	 -1.543***	
	
(0.129)	 (0.155)	 (0.212)	 (0.214)	
	     GC	in	Flanders	(in	1000	EUR)	
	  
0.093***	 0.075***	










	   
(0.013)	 (0.014)	
	     Year	fixed	effects	(base=2016)	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Sample	period	 2006-2016	 2006-2016	 2006-2016	 2009-2016	
	     Constant	 -1.344***	 -48.922***	 -49.072***	 -48.423***	
	
(0.275)	 (3.545)	 (3.546)	 (3.502)	








positive	 effect,	 but	 the	 estimated	 coefficient	 of	 0.633	 is	 significantly	 less	 than	 1,	
suggesting	 that	 new	 adoptions	 increases	 less	 than	 proportionally	with	 the	 number	 of	
households.	Specification	(2)	incorporates	the	demographic	variables	𝑥!.	This	results	in	
a	 coefficient	 for	 the	 number	 of	 households	 that	 does	 not	 differ	 significantly	 from	 1,	
implying	an	intuitive	proportional	relationship	between	new	adopters	and	the	number	
of	 households.	 The	 estimated	 coefficients	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 variables	 have	 the	




show	 some	 interesting	 effects.	 The	 coefficient	 for	 the	 Brussels	 region	 becomes	much	






federal	 tax	 cut	policies	or	 the	 investment	price	of	PVs.	Hence,	 (3)	 and	 (4)	 identify	 the	
effect	of	the	GC	benefits	from	within-region	time	variation.	
According	to	specification	(3),	an	increase	in	the	net	present	value	of	GCs	by	1000	EUR	





For	both	 (3)	 and	 (4),	 the	higher	estimated	effect	 in	Flanders	 than	 in	Wallonia	may	be	
because	GCs	have	a	fixed	price	in	Flanders,	while	their	price	fluctuates	in	Wallonia	and	









up	 to	 3.2	 times	 larger	 than	 in	 2016.	 In	 contrast,	 according	 to	 specification	 (3),	which	
																																																								
11	Our	NPV	estimates	are	based	on	 the	GC	price	at	 the	adoption	date.	 	 	 In	Wallonia,	market	prices	were	














These	 findings	 are	 suggestive	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 GC	 policy	 in	 explaining	 the	 adoption	
levels,	but	they	need	to	be	interpreted	with	proper	caution.	First,	the	descriptive	model	
is	not	motivated	by	economic	theory:	it	does	not	explicitly	model	how	households	trade	
off	 upfront	 investment	 costs	with	 future	benefits.	 This	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 include	 all	
sources	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	 and	 obtain	 reliable	 estimates	 of	 their	 effect,	 especially	
when	some	of	them	show	little	variation	in	the	data.	Second,	the	data	were	aggregated	at	
the	yearly	 level,	while	Figure	3	showed	 that	 there	 is	also	 rich	within-year	variation	 in	
adoptions.	 A	model	with	 forward-looking	 agents	 is	 crucial	 to	 exploit	 this	 variation	 as	
households	 often	 postpone	 their	 adoption	 to	 the	 last	 month	 before	 a	 regime	 drop.	
Looking	 only	 at	 the	 current	 period	 investment	 opportunities	 is	 therefore	 not	
appropriate	to	explain	their	behavior	at	such	a	high	frequency.	Third,	the	analysis	was	
done	for	a	representative	PV	model	of	4kWp,	but	there	is	relevant	variation	in	the	costs	




Our	 dynamic	 model	 follows	 De	 Groote	 and	 Verboven	 (2019).	 It	 explicitly	 takes	 into	
account	 two	 trade-offs	 households	 face.	 First,	 it	 considers	 the	 investment	 trade-off	 by	















takes	 into	 account	 a	 dynamic	 trade-off	 by	 modeling	 households	 as	 forward-looking	
agents	who	have	expectations	about	future	costs	and	benefits	and	wait	for	the	ideal	time	
to	adopt.		
The	 estimates	 from	 this	 model	 will	 enable	 us	 to	 derive	 the	 households’	 general	




We	 consider	 a	 model	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 region	 𝑐 	(rather	 than	 the	 individual	
municipalities	 as	 in	 the	 static	 model).14		 In	 a	 given	 month	𝑡	a	 household	𝑖	located	 in	
region	𝑐	may	 either	 choose	 not	 to	 adopt	 a	 PV,	𝑗 = 0,	 or	 choose	 to	 adopt	 one	 of	 the	








Let	𝑣!"#	be	 the	 expected	discounted	utility	 of	 adoption,	 net	 of	 the	 taste	 shock	𝜀!"#$ .	We	
can	write	this	as	follows:	
𝑣!"# = 𝑥!"#𝛾! − 𝛼!𝑝!" + 𝛼!𝜃!𝑏!"# + 𝜉!"# , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽	
where		𝑥!"#	is	a	vector	of	characteristics	of	alternative	𝑗	at	period	𝑡	in	region	𝑐,	𝑝!"	is	the	
upfront	 investment	cost	and	𝑏!"#	is	 the	total	discounted	benefits	 for	adoption	at	time	𝑡.	
We	described	the	various	components	of	𝑏!"#	earlier	in	section	2.2.1.	The	term	𝜉!"#	is	an	
unobserved	 product	 characteristic,	 known	 to	 the	 household	 but	 not	 to	 the	
econometrician.	
The	 parameter	𝛼! ,	 which	 is	 allowed	 to	 be	 specific	 to	 each	 region	𝑐 ,	 measures	 the	
households’	 sensitivity	 to	 the	upfront	 investment	price.	The	parameter	𝜃! 	captures	 the	






𝑣!!! = 𝑢!!! + 𝛿𝐸!𝑉!"!!,	
where	𝑢!!!	is	 the	 utility	 derived	 from	 not	 adopting	 PV	 at	 time	𝑡,	𝑉!"!!  is	 the	 ex-ante	










ln 𝑆!"# − ln 𝑆!!! − 𝛿 ln 𝑆!!!!! = 𝑥!"# − 𝛿𝑥!!!!! 𝛾! 	
−𝛼!(𝑝!" − 𝛿𝑝!!!!)+ 𝛼!𝜃!(𝑏!"# − 𝛿𝑏!!!!!)+ 𝜉!"# − 𝛿(𝜉!!!!! − 𝜂!"),	
where	𝜂!" ≡ 𝑉!"!! − 𝐸!𝑉!"!! 	is	 an	 expectation	 error,	 and	𝑆!"# 	is	 the	 observed	 market	
share	 of	 alternative	𝑗,	 i.e.	 the	 number	 of	 new	 adopters	 of	𝑗	relative	 to	 the	 potential	
number	of	households	who	did	not	yet	adopt	a	PV	system.	
This	 regression	 equation	 is	 essentially	 a	 dynamic	 Euler	 equation.	 Note	 that	 the	 error	
term	 of	 the	 regression	 consists	 of	 both	 the	 unobserved	 characteristics	 and	 the	
expectation	 error.	 If	 the	 price	 is	 endogenous	 (correlated	 with	 unobserved	
characteristics),	 we	 could	 estimate	 this	 using	 instrumental	 variables.	We	 will	 instead	
treat	prices	as	exogenous,	conditional	on	a	set	of	 fixed	effects	 for	each	capacity	choice	
and	 each	 year.	 We	 also	 do	 a	 robustness	 check	 with	 a	 full	 set	 of	 capacity/year	 fixed	
effects.	Intuitively,	this	assumption	means	that	any	monthly	price	variation	within	a	year	
is	 not	 driven	 by	 local	 demand	 forces,	 but	 rather	 by	 global	 market	 conditions,	 which	
appears	to	be	reasonable	given	the	small	size	of	Belgium.16	
To	estimate	the	model	we	make	use	of	our	data	on	new	PV	installations	for	each	capacity	
level	𝑗,	 region	𝑐	and	month	𝑡	and	on	 the	upfront	 investment	price	𝑝!" ,	 and	we	measure	
the	future	benefits	as	
𝑏!"# = 𝑏!"#




Table	 3	 presents	 the	 empirical	 results	 of	 the	 dynamic	 model,	 for	 four	 different	
specifications.	 The	 total	 number	 of	 observations	 is	 920,	 consisting	 of	 5	 capacity	
alternatives,	 observed	 in	 2	 regions17	over	 92	months	 (i.e.	 7	 years	 and	 8	months	 from	
May	 2009	 to	 December	 2016).	 The	 “common	 valuations”	 specifications	 (1)	 and	 (2)	
assume	 that	 the	 regions	 have	 a	 common	 valuation	 of	 price	 (𝛼! = 𝛼)	 and	 a	 common	
relative	valuation	of	future	benefits	(𝜃! = 𝜃).	The	“regional	valuations”	specifications	(3)	
and	 (4)	 allow	 these	 valuations	 to	 be	 specific	 to	 the	 regions.	 The	 odd-numbered	





imposes	𝜃! = 1,	 and	 estimates	𝛿	as	 the	 households’	 implicit	 discount	 factor	 (possibly	 region-specific),	
both	 in	 the	 conditional	 value	 function	 of	𝑗 = 0	and	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 benefits	𝑏!"# .	 We	 then	 derive	
similar	conclusions	about	price	sensitivity	and	the	valuation	of	benefits.	














		 		 		 		 		
Price	sensitivity	(α)	












	   
(0.0881)	 (0.0892)	
Relative	valuation	benefits	(θ)	 	 	












	   
(0.0228)	 (0.0174)	
	     Region	and	capacity	specific	constants	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Controls	non-GC	benefits	 NO	 NO	 NO	 NO	
Year	FE	and	quarter	of	year	FE	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	
Common	alpha	and	theta	 YES	 YES	 NO	 NO	
	     Observations	 920	 920	 920	 920	





The	 common	 valuation	 specifications	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 show	 that	 households	 have	 a	
significant	general	price	sensitivity	(𝛼),	and	that	the	relative	valuation	of	future	benefits	
compared	 with	 upfront	 costs	 is	 low	 (𝜃 	close	 to	 0.4).	 This	 suggests	 stronger	 time	
discounting	than	found	by	De	Groote	and	Verboven	(2019),	which	applied	to	a	shorter	
period	 (up	 to	 2012)	 and	 only	 the	 region	 of	 Flanders.	 They	 found	 that	 consumers	 are	
willing	to	pay	only	0.5	Euro	upfront	for	one	extra	euro	of	future	subsidy	benefits	(at	an	
interest	 rate	 of	 3%).	 	 The	 results	 in	 specifications	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 show	 slightly	 higher	
discounting.			
In	 our	 descriptive	model	 (section	 3.1),	 we	 found	 a	 smaller	 impact	 of	 GC	 subsidies	 in	
Wallonia,	compared	to	other	regions.	The	dynamic	model	allows	us	to	investigate	if	this	
follows	from	a	higher	sensitivity	to	monetary	incentives	(𝛼)	or	a	lower	relative	valuation	
of	benefits	 compare	 to	 investment	costs	 (𝜃).	 Specifications	 (3)	and	 (4)	allow	 for	 these	
regional	differences	and	show	evidence	of	both:	households	in	Flanders	are	more	price-






on	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 GC	 price	may	 imply	 a	 higher	 discounting	 of	 future	 benefit	 in	
Wallonia.18	However,	 it	 is	 also	possible	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	different	 policy	 context,		
which	may	have	created	confusion	or	political	uncertainty.		
In	 sum,	 these	 findings	 show	 that	 households	 show	 significant	 sensitivity	 to	monetary	
incentives,	especially	so	in	Flanders.	After	controlling	for	this	difference	in	sensitivity	to	
monetary	 reasons	 to	 adopt,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 design	 of	 the	 GC	 policy	was	 relatively	





The	 generous	 subsidies	 (documented	 in	 section	 2)	 and	 the	 massive	 PV	 adoption	
(documented	in	section	3)	implied	substantial	and	increasing	financial	costs	to	society.	
This	has	subsequently	led	to	intense	political	debate	and	subsidies	to	solar	PV	became	a	















This	GC	debt	 is	an	accumulated	amount	of	 subsidies	 that	were	paid	 to	 the	beneficiary	
households	(the	prosumers)	but	which	were	not	yet	paid	by	society	(through	increased	
electricity	prices	or	 taxes).	 	Around	2012,	 it	 became	apparent	 that	 the	GC	mechanism	
was	 extremely	 costly	 and	 that	 this	 cost	would	 be	 passed	 through	 to	 consumers.	 	 The	




18	Nicolini	 and	 Tavoni	 (2017)	 document	 that	 feed-in-tariffs	 guaranteeing	 a	 fixed	 payment	 per	
kWh	produced	 (like	 the	GC	 system	 in	 place	 in	 Flanders	 for	 solar)	 are	more	 effective	 than	 the	
tradeable	green	certicate	mechanism	to	stimulate	investment	in	renewables.			








the	market	 to	 the	 retailers,	who	had	quota	obligations	 to	 sell	 an	 (increasing)	 share	of	
green	 electricity.	 	When	 the	 guaranteed	 price	 exceeds	 the	market	 price,	 the	DSOs	 are	
making	 losses	 when	 they	 resell	 GCs.	 	 These	 losses	 are	 important	 and	 continue	 to	 be	
accumulated	because	the	GC	rights	are	granted	for	a	long	period.			
To	 finance	 this	debt,	Flanders	 imposed,	 in	2015,	a	 flat	 tax	on	each	consumption	point.	
The	 amount	 of	 the	 tax	 increased	 with	 the	 level	 of	 consumption,	 but	 only	 to	 a	 small	
extent,	 which	 was	 the	 main	 critique	 in	 the	 public	 debate.	 The	 tax	 was	 substantial.	
Consumers	with	a	consumption	level	<5MWh/year	had	to	pay	an	additional	€100.		The	
tax	 was	 abolished	 from	 January	 2018	 on	 and	 replaced	 by	 a	 low	 fee	 of	 about	 €9	 per	
year. 20 	The	 abolishment	 of	 this	 contentious	 tax 21 	came	 after	 a	 decision	 by	 the	
constitutional	court	on	June	2017.		




Second,	 the	default	buyer,	 the	TSO,	had	 to	buy	many	GCs	at	 the	minimum	guaranteed	
price.	
Some	of	the	excessive	GCs	bought	by	the	TSO	were	cancelled	and,	therefore,	no	longer	
available	 on	 the	market.	 In	 exchange,	 the	 TSO	 introduced	 a	 specific	 surcharge	 to	 the	








their	 contribution	 to	 the	 network	 cost	 decreases	 and	 could	 be	 zero	 if	 their	 yearly	
production	exceeds	their	yearly	consumption.24		
To	recover	their	costs	(mostly	fixed),	the	DSOs	have	to	adapt	their	tariffs.	Flanders	and	





























The	 cost	 of	 the	 subsidies	 and	 the	way	 they	were	 financed	 translated	 into	 changes	 in	
electricity	prices.	The	following	figure	show	the	evolution	of	the	retail	price	of	electricity	
for	 a	 representative	 consumer	 in	 Flanders,	 Wallonia	 and	 Brussels.	 	 Prices	 started	 to	
diverge	from	2012,	reflecting	the	different	policy	choices	made	by	the	regions,	mainly	to	
finance	 the	 support	 to	 green	 energy	 sources.	 	 As	 can	 be	 observed	 on	 the	 figure,	 the	













The	above	 financing	 issues	 involved	a	political	debate	around	two	main	controversies.	
First,	there	was	a	debate	on	the	generosity	of	the	GC	subsidies,	which	were	considered	
too	generous,	and	needed	to	be	revised	downwards	several	times.	The	prosumers	who	
had	 adopted	 in	 the	 most	 generous	 years	 (up	 to	 2012)	 had	 received	 very	 important	
windfall	 profits,	 and	 there	 was	 an	 increasing	 awareness	 that	 these	 would	 eventually	
have	to	be	paid	by	the	electricity	consumers.	 	The	evolution	of	electricity	prices	shows	
that	it	is	indeed	the	case.			




These	 controversies	were	 largely	 echoed	 in	 the	 press.	 They	were	 part	 of	 the	 political	
debate.	 	 The	 issue	 is	 important	 because	 it	 is	 related	 to	 the	 energy	 transition	 and	 the	
policies	that	should	be	implemented	to	address	climate	change.		The	discussions	on	the	
subsidies	 given	 to	 solar	 PVs	 illustrate	 that	 the	 energy	 transition	 is	 costly	 process	 and	
that	 costs	 and	benefits	were	unequally	 shared	 among	 citizens	 i.e.	 there	 are	 important	
redistributional	concerns	associated	with	climate	change.			
Finally,	 although	 the	 debates	 and	 the	 controversies	 were	 similar	 in	 Flanders	 and	



























































































charge	of	 energy.	 	 The	 regional	 governments	 are	 appointed	 for	 a	period	of	 five	 years,	
following	 the	 regional	 elections	 that	 took	 place	 in	 2004,	 2009,	 2014	 and	 2019.	 	 	 The	
electoral	 system	 is	 a	 proportional	 system	 and	 the	 political	 spectrum	 is	 highly	
fragmented.			Regional	governements	are		governed	by	a	coalition	of	parties,	at	least	two	
in	Wallonia	and	three	in	Flanders,	formed	after	the	election.							
The	 generous	 subsidy	 programs	 were	 implemented	 by	 the	 government	 during	 the	
legislature	of	2004-09.25		The	government	acting	during	the	2009-2014	legislature	had	
to	adapt	and	 later	suppress	the	GC	mechanism.	 	 	During	this	term,	 it	became	apparent	
that,	on	the	one	hand,	the	investors	benefited	from	a	high	return	and,	on	the	other	hand,	
that	 the	 mechanism	 was	 costly	 and	 that	 these	 costs	 will	 be	 passed	 through	 to	
consumers.	 	Furthermore,	earlier	unsuccesful	attempts	to	impose	a	prosumer	fee	were	
discussed	during	 this	 term.	 	 	 The	 government	 appointed	 for	 the	2014-19	 term	had	 to	
impose	 correcting	 measures	 to	 finance	 the	 GC	 debt	 and	 the	 net	 metering.	 	 As	 we	
explained	 above,	 the	 government	 in	 Flanders	 had	 the	 intention	 to	 pass	 all	 the	 cost	 to	
consumers	 and,	 to	 that	 end,	 it	 imposed	 a	 flat	 tax	 on	 electricity	 consumption	 and	 a	
prosumer	fee	in	2015.			The	government	in	Wallonia	was	more	prudent	and	passed	only	
part	 of	 the	 GC	 debt	 to	 consumers.	 	 The	 prosumer	 fee	 that	 the	 regulator	 wanted	 to	
impose	was	 challenged	 by	 the	 government	 and	 it	 became	 a	 political	 issue	 during	 the	
campaign	for	the	2019’s	election.		
It	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	green	parties	were	not	necessarily	 the	main	advocates	 for	
those	policies.			In	Flanders,	the	green	party	did	not	approve	the	policy	in	parliament	and	
was	not	part	of	the	regional	government	since	2004.	 	In	Wallonia,	the	green	party	was	
part	 of	 the	 majority	 only	 for	 the	 period	 2009-2014	 and,	 during	 this	 term,	 it	 was	 in	
charge	 of	 the	 energy	policy.	 	 	 	 The	 following	 table	 details	 the	 composition	of	 regional	
each	government.			
Table	4:	Regional	majorities		
































We	 consider	 various	 possible	 hypotheses	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 subsidy	 programs	 on	
voters’	responses.	Our	 first	hypothesis	 is	 that	voters	who	benefited	from	the	subsidies	
reward	the	government	that	designed	the	subsidy	scheme	by	voting	for	the	responsible	
parties.	 This	 is	 the	 ‘buying	 votes’	 hypothesis,	 according	 to	 which	 governments	 will	
implement	certain	policies	to	buy	votes	from	the	current	beneficiaries	of	the	subsidies	
(Biais	 and	 Perotti,	 2002	 and	 Ovaere	 and	 Proost,	 2015).	 A	 second	 hypothesis	 is	 that	




did	not	benefit	 from	the	subsidies	punish	 the	government,	 if	 it	becomes	apparent	 that	
they	 end	 up	 paying	 a	 considerable	 part	 of	 the	 subsidy	 costs	 without	 receiving	 any	
benefits.			
Finally,	 instead	 of	 rewarding	 the	 government	 that	 established	 the	 program	 (as	 in	 the	
buying	 votes	 hypothesis),	 investors	 may	 punish	 the	 government	 that	 changed	 the	







2019).	 We	 calculate	 the	 vote	 share	 of	 the	 2004-2009	 government	 parties	 in	 each	
municipality	𝑚	and	election	year	𝑡	and	consider	the	following	regression	model:		






Our	 identification	 strategy	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 a	 differences-in-differences	 estimator.	
The	parameters	𝛾!	are	our	main	interest.	They	capture	how	votes	changed	differently	in	
areas	 with	 more	 PVs,	 while	 controlling	 for	 time-invariant	 differences	 between	
municipalities,	 aggregate	 trends	 over	 time,	 and	 local	 changes	 in	 votes	 related	 to	
																																																								
26	The	 first	 phase	 of	 the	policy	 ended	 after	 2012	 in	 Flanders	 and	 in	 2014	 in	Wallonia.	 Brussels	 did	 not	
make	major	adjustments	in	our	sample	period	so	we	include	all	adoptions.	We	define	government	parties	
by	 region:	 in	 Flanders,	 we	 use	 all	 votes	 for	 CVP/CD&V,	 VU,	 NV-A,	 SP.a,	 SLP/Spirit	 and	 (Open)	 VLD,	
including	 cartels	 formed	 among	 them.	 For	Wallonia,	we	 use	 PS	 and	 PSC/CDH.	 For	 Brussels	we	 use	 PS,	
PSC/CDH,	ECOLO,	 (Open)	VLD,	SP.a,	SLP/Spirit,	CVP/CD&V	and	 the	cartel	votes	CD&V-NV-A	(we	do	not	
include	VU/NV-A	separately	as	they	never	had	a	minister	in	the	government	of	Brussels).			
27	We	 use	 public	 information	 provided	 by	 the	 Belgian	 government.	 For	 the	 years	 1995-1999	 the	
information	was	 obtained	 from	 http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/.	 For	 2004-2019,	 we	 obtain	 the	 data	 from	
https://verkiezingenXXXX.belgium.be/	with	XXXX	referring	to	the	election	year.	
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demographic	 characteristics.	 A	 non-significant	 value	 for	 γ	 means	 that	 votes	 are	 not	
affected	by	PV	adoption;	on	the	contrary,	a	significant	γ 	means	that	a	higher	adoption	of	
PVs	 is	 expected	 to	 have	 a	 stronger	 impact	 on	 votes.	We	 expect	 a	 significant	 value	 for	
γ after	2009,	to	give	support	to	our	hypotheses,.	First,	if	votes	by	PV	owners	change,	we	
should	see	 larger	effects	 in	 these	areas.	Second,	 if	votes	of	non-PV	owners	change,	we	
can	still	expect	a	larger	effect	in	these	areas	as	people	living	close	to	PVs	are	expected	to	
be	more	aware	of	this	policy	issue.	
We	 use	 the	 election	 year	𝑡 = 2004	as	 the	 base:	 this	 is	 the	 time	 when	 the	 relevant	
government	parties	were	elected	and	designed	the	main	PV	subsidy	schemes.	Our	main	
interest	 is	 in	 the	 coefficients	 in	 the	 subsequent	 years,	 i.e.	𝛾!""#,	𝛾!"#$	and	𝛾!"#$.	 These	
coefficients	 will	 tell	 us	 how	 voters	 rewarded	 or	 punished	 the	 government.	 We	 also	
estimate	the	𝛾!	for	the	two	election	years	preceding	2004.	These	serve	as	placebo	tests	
as	we	 expect	 these	 coefficients	 to	 be	 insignificantly	 different	 from	 zero	 if	 the	 parallel	
trend	assumption	holds.	
In	an	extension	to	our	analysis,	we	change	the	outcome	variable	𝑌!"	to	consider	election	












distinguish	 between	 3	 groups	 of	 cantons,	 categorizing	 them	 in	 low,	 middle	 or	 high	
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adoption	 areas.	We	 then	 calculate	 the	 change	 in	 votes	 for	 the	2004-2009	government	
parties	 since	 2004	 and	 plot	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 high	 adoption	 and	 the	 low	
adoption	group.		In	both	regions,	we	observe	a	negative	effect	in	the	first	election	after	
the	 policy	 change,	 suggesting	 that	 voters	 punished,	 rather	 than	 rewarded	 the	
government.	 It	 further	 suggests	 that	 the	 effect	 remained	 persistent	 in	 2014	 and	 then	
diminished	in	Wallonia,	but	got	amplified	in	Flanders.	
Table	 5	 investigates	 this	 more	 formally	 through	 our	 regression	 model.	 The	 outcome	
variable	𝑌!"	refers	 to	 the	election	 results	of	 the	 incumbent	parties.	 Specification	 (1)	 is	
our	base	specification,	which	includes	a	full	set	of	municipality	and	region-specific	time	
fixed	 effects.	 According	 to	 the	 specification,	 municipalities	 with	 a	 high	 cumulative	
adoption	rate	voted	significantly	less	for	the	incumbent	parties	in	the	election	year	2009	
(compared	 with	 2004).	 A	 10	 percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	 adoption	 rate	 reduces	
votes	by	2.44	percentage	points.	This	 effect	persisted	 in	 the	 subsequent	election	year,	




		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
	
Base	 +	controls	 Region-specific	effects	
		 		 		 Base	 x	Flanders	 x	Brussels	
Year	x	%PV	 	     1995	 0.122	 0.167	 0.098	 0.170	 -5.707	
	
(0.128)	 (0.241)	 (0.304)	 (0.250)	 (8.694)	
1999	 0.109	 0.184	 0.113	 0.169	 -8.429	
	
(0.089)	 (0.160)	 (0.195)	 (0.167)	 (6.643)	
2004	
Benchmark	
	2009	 -0.244**	 -0.556**	 -0.439	 -0.311	 0.840	
	
(0.117)	 (0.233)	 (0.272)	 (0.259)	 (6.539)	
2014	 -0.247**	 -0.752***	 -0.528**	 -0.630***	 -4.837	
	
(0.123)	 (0.218)	 (0.224)	 (0.235)	 (8.188)	
2019	 -0.456***	 -0.872***	 -0.642***	 -0.622***	 -0.826	
	
(0.119)	 (0.240)	 (0.240)	 (0.239)	 (9.324)	
	      Municipality	FE	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Year	FE	x	controls	 NO	 YES	 YES	
Year	x	region	FE	 YES	 YES	 YES	
	      Observations	 1,991	 1,991	 1,991	







To	explore	 this	 further,	we	ask	 to	what	 extent	 voters	behaved	differently	 in	 the	 three	
regions.	 Specification	 (3)	 therefore	 extends	 specification	 (2)	 by	 including	 interaction	
effects	for	the	regions	(𝛾!"	instead	of	𝛾!).	The	base	refers	to	Wallonia,	and	shows	that	the	
negative	 impact	has	strengthened	for	the	 last	 two	election	years.	There	 is	a	significant	
additional	negative	impact	in	Flanders,	consistent	with	both	the	special	energy	tax	that	
was	 introduced	 (affecting	 all	 voters)	 and	 the	 earlier	 introduction	 of	 the	 grid	 fee	







envious	 that	 the	subsidy	 is	used	 to	 transfer	wealth	 to	 their	direct	neighbors.	 In	places	






We	 provide	 further	 evidence	 that	 the	 negative	 effect	 is	 driven	 by	 non-adopters	 by	
extending	 our	 regression	 model	 with	 the	 cumulative	 adoption	 rate	 of	 neighboring	
municipalities	 and	 estimate	 election-specific	 effects.	 If	 non-adopters	 drive	 the	 results,	











		 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	
	
PTB	 ECOLO	 PS	 CDH	 MR	 FN,	PP	
		 PVDA	 GROEN	 SPA	 CD&V,	NVA,	VU	 VLD	 VLB,	LDD	
Year	x	%PV	 	      1995	 0.001	 -0.059	 0.039	 0.059	 -0.069	 -0.058	
	
(0.013)	 (0.079)	 (0.232)	 (0.277)	 (0.268)	 (0.091)	
1999	 -0.003	 -0.033	 0.068	 -0.022	 -0.104	 -0.007	
	
(0.011)	 (0.076)	 (0.182)	 (0.168)	 (0.189)	 (0.065)	
2004	
Benchmark	
	2009	 0.035**	 0.216*	 -0.259*	 -0.242	 -0.134	 0.361***	
	
(0.014)	 (0.118)	 (0.138)	 (0.204)	 (0.134)	 (0.123)	
2014	 0.228***	 -0.052	 -0.422**	 -0.271	 0.007	 0.329***	
	
(0.075)	 (0.065)	 (0.180)	 (0.251)	 (0.204)	 (0.123)	
2019	 0.127	 -0.028	 -0.510***	 -0.360	 0.091	 0.486***	
	
(0.094)	 (0.082)	 (0.175)	 (0.250)	 (0.197)	 (0.148)	
	       Municipality	FE	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Year	FE	x	controls	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Year	x	region	FE	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
	       Observations	 1,991	 1,991	 1,991	 1,991	 1,991	 1,991	








the	votes	 for	 the	 left	 parties	 (PS	 and	SP.A).	Both	parties	were	 consistently	part	 of	 the	
regional	governments	between	2004	and	2014	and	had	an	important	role	in	the	policy	
design.	 Note	 that	 effects	 on	 parties	 in	 the	 center	 are	 also	 negative	 and	 large,	 but	 not	
estimated	precisely.	28	
																																																								












A	 second	 finding	 is	 that	 the	votes	primarily	went	 to	parties	 that	were	never	part	 of	 a	
government.	They	are	situated	on	the	most	left	(PTB-PVDA)	or	most	right	(FN,	PP,	LDD,	








Governments	 are	 taking	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 technology-specific	 measures	 to	
combat	 climate	 change.	 This	 paper	 has	 looked	 the	 very	 generous	 subsidy	 policies	 to	
solar	PVs	in	the	three	regions	of	Belgium	to	ask	the	question	how	voters	responded	to	
these	programs.	We	have	provided	evidence	that	voters	did	not	reward	the	incumbent	
government	 that	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 program,	 as	 predicted	 by	 the	 ‘buying-votes’	
hypothesis.	Instead,	we	found	that	voters	punish	the	incumbent	government	because	of	
the	increasing	awareness	of	the	high	financing	costs.	These	did	not	only	affect	the	non-
adopting	 electricity	 consumers	 who	 did	 not	 benefit	 from	 the	 programs,	 but	 also	 the	




in	a	context	where	uncertainty	is	 important.	 	There	is	a	 lot	of	uncertainty	surrounding	
the	 evolution	of	 the	 technology	 and	 its	 costs,	 the	willingness	 to	 adopt	by	 citizens,	 etc.	




too	 high	 for	 a	 period	 that	 was	 too	 long. 30 	Furthermore,	 governments	 (who	 are	
constrained	by	tight	budgetary	rules)	preferred	production	subsidies	to	upfront	rebates,	
although	these	turned	out	to	be	less	effective.	
Second,	 governments	 did	 not	 commit	 to	 a	 mechanism	 to	 adapt	 the	 support	 to	 the	
changing	market	conditions.	Pani	and	Perroni	(2018)	show	that	politicians	do	not	want	
to	commit	to	a	progressive	fading-out	of	the	subsidy	schemes	for	political	and	electoral	



















lack	 the	 necessary	 information.	 	 One	 way	 to	 overcome	 part	 of	 these	 difficulties	 is	 to	
design	a	mechanism	that	 is	 fexible	enough	to	adapt	 to	 the	economic	and	technological	
changes.		Alternatively,	economic-wide	measures	like	CO2	taxation	could	be	used.	These	
measures	 are	 often	 not	 implemented	 because	 they	 lack	 the	 political	 support	 that	
technology-specific	policies	do	tend	to	have.	An	independent	institution	could	therefore	
















We	use	 the	most	 common	VAT	 rate	 (6%)	and	extrapolate	 the	data	by	using	 four	data	
points	 that	were	used	by	government	agency	VEA	 to	calculate	 subsidies	 in	 June	2013,	
December	2013,	June	2014	and	January	2015	for	a	5kW	system.31	We	additionally	use	a	
data	 point	 in	 February	 2018	 for	 a	 larger	 system	 because	 subsidies	 were	 no	 longer	
calculated	 for	 smaller	 ones	 (source:	 https://www.energiesparen.be/overzicht-
bandingfactor-zonnepanelen,	consulted	on	28/02/2020).	Finally,	we	requested	the	price	
of	a	5kW	system	on	 the	website	of	energy	supplier,	Luminus,	 to	assign	a	price	 for	 the	
end	 of	 2019	 (source:	 https://www.luminus.be/nl/apps/flows/prijs-zonnepanelen/,	
consulted	on	17/01/2020).	We	use	this	data	to	calculate	the	growth	rate	in	the	relevant	
size	category	since	the	last	observation	in	De	Groote	&	Verboven	(2019)	and	apply	this	








For	 Flanders,	 additional	 information	 was	 collected	 on	 the	 government	 website	
www.energiesparen.be.	 It	 contains	 the	 reports	 of	 the	 VEA	 about	 the	 newly	 applicable	
granting	 rates	of	GCs	 (we	used	 the	 same	 reports	 to	obtain	 information	on	 investment	
costs),	as	well	as	information	on	the	grid	fees.	
	
For	 the	 policies	 that	 are	 specific	 to	 Wallonia,	 we	 use	 the	 specific	 report	 on	 green	
certificates	 published	 yearly	 by	 the	 regional	 regulator	 and	 the	 specific	 information	







Finally,	our	main	source	 for	 the	policies	 in	Brussel	 is	 the	regional	regulator.	 	Data	and	






































With	a	 type	1	extreme	value	distribution	 for	 the	 random	 taste	 shocks	𝜀!"# ,	 the	ex	ante	
value	function	has	the	well-known	closed-form	logsum	expression:	







𝑉!"!! = 0.577+ 𝑣!!!!! − ln 𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! ,	
where	 	 𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! 	is	 the	 probability	 to	 choose	 option	 𝑗 = 1 	when	 agents	 have	
information	 𝑣!"!! = 𝑣!!!!!, 𝑣!!!!!,… , 𝑣!"#!! . 	This	 follows	 from	 rearranging	
𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! = exp 𝑣!!!!! exp 𝑣!"#!!
!
!!! ,	taking	 logs	 and	 substituting	 in	 the	 first	
expression.	
Now	define	the	expectation	error	𝜂!" ≡ 𝑉!"!! − 𝐸!𝑉!"!!,	and	substitute	this	together	with	
the	 above	 expression	 for	𝑉!"!!	to	 write	 the	 conditional	 value	 function	 of	 no	 adoption	
from	the	main	text	as:	
𝑣!!! = 𝑢!!! + 𝛿0.577+ 𝛿𝑣!!! − 𝛿 ln 𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! − 𝛿𝜂!"	
= 𝑢!!! + 𝛿0.577+ 𝛿 𝑥!!!!!𝛾! − 𝛼!𝑝!!!! + 𝛼!𝜃!𝑏!!!!! + 𝜉!!!!! 	
−𝛿 ln 𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! − 𝛿𝜂!" . 
	
Deriving	the	regression	equation	
With	 random	 utility	 maximization,	 we	 obtain	 the	 following	 choice	 probabilities	 or	
predicted	market	shares	for	each	alternative	𝑗 = 0,… , 𝐽	at	period	𝑡	in	region	𝑐:	






with	 	𝑆!"# 	the	 observed	 market	 shares.	 Taking	 logs	 and	 rearranging,	 we	 write	 the	
following	linear	regression	equation:	
ln 𝑆!"# − ln 𝑆!!!
= 𝑥!"#𝛾! − 𝛼!𝑝!"# + 𝛼!𝜃!𝑏!"# + 𝜉!"#
− 𝑢!!! + 𝛿0.577+ 𝛿 𝑥!!!!!𝛾 − 𝛼!𝑝!!!!! + 𝛼!𝜃!𝑏!!!!! + 𝜉!!!!!
− 𝛿 ln 𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! − 𝛿𝜂!" 	
We	 assume	 the	 flow	 utility	 of	 the	 outside	 option	 remains	 constant	 over	 time	 and	
normalize	 it	 such	 that	 𝑢!!! = −𝛿0.577 	.	 We	 also	 make	 use	 of	 random	 utility	
maximization	to	set	𝑠!!!!! 𝑣!"!! = 𝑆!!!!!	.	Rearranging	terms	we	obtain:	
ln 𝑆!"# − ln 𝑆!!! − 𝛿 ln 𝑆!!!!!  
= 𝑥!"# − 𝛿𝑥!!!!! 𝛾! − 𝛼!(𝑝!"# − 𝛿𝑝!!!!!)+ 𝛼!𝜃!(𝑏!"# − 𝛿𝑏!!!!!)+ 𝜉!"# − 𝛿(𝜉!!!!! −
𝜂!").	
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If	𝛿	is	 known	 (we	use	 a	 yearly	market	 interest	 rate	 of	 3%),	 this	 is	 a	 linear	 regression	
with	 outcome	 variable	 𝑌!"# =𝑙𝑛  𝑆!"#  −𝑙𝑛  𝑆!!! − 𝛿 𝑙𝑛  𝑆!!!!!   	and	 regressors	 𝑋!"# =





We	use	 the	 specification	 detailed	 in	 the	main	 text	 of	 the	 paper	 for	 the	 election	 years	
2014	 and	 2019,	 but	 we	 lack	 data	 at	 the	 municipality	 level	 for	 the	 elections	 of	 1995,	
1999,	2004	and	2009.	 	 For	 these	years,	 data	 are	only	 available	 at	 the	 canton	 level.	 	A	
canton	 is	 either	 a	municipality	 or	 a	 group	 of	 adjacent	municipalities.	 	 There	 are	 209	




𝑌!" = 𝑋!𝛽! + 𝛾!𝐶𝑈𝑀_𝑃𝑉! + 𝐹𝐸! + 𝐹𝐸! + 𝑒!" .	
In	 some	years	we	do	not	observe	𝑌!"	but	we	do	observe	 the	 canton-level	 vote	 shares,	
defined	 as	 	𝑌!" = 𝑤!𝑌!"!∈! 	with	𝑎 	an	 indicator	 for	 the	 aggregated	 unit	 (i.e.	 the	
canton),	𝐴	the	set	of	municipalities	in	𝑎	and	𝑤!	the	share	of	voters	that	come	from	each	
municipality.	 We	 assume	 this	 share	 is	 stable	 over	 time	 and	 proxied	 by	 the	 share	 of	
households	living	in	each	municipality,	a	variable	we	observe	in	our	data.33	We	can	then	
rewrite	the	municipality-level	regression	at	the	canton	level:				
𝑌!" = 𝛽! 𝑤!
!∈!








The	 linearity	of	 the	regression	equation	makes	 it	 straightforward	 to	apply	 this.	Before	
estimation	we	need	to	calculate	weighted	averages	of	control	variables,	adoption	rates,	




























	    1995	 0.088	 0.090	 -0.228	 0.579*	
	
(0.135)	 (0.133)	 (0.311)	 (0.335)	
1999	 0.133	 -0.066	 -0.015	 0.417*	
	
(0.090)	 (0.104)	 (0.213)	 (0.224)	
2004	
	    
     2009	 -0.218*	 -0.069	 -0.418	 -0.374	
	
(0.126)	 (0.107)	 (0.358)	 (0.366)	
2014	 -0.123	 -0.276**	 -0.260	 -0.862***	
	
(0.126)	 (0.111)	 (0.263)	 (0.301)	
2019	 -0.304***	 -0.358***	 -0.439	 -0.551	
	
(0.116)	 (0.117)	 (0.301)	 (0.335)	
	     Municipality	FE	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
Year	FE	x	controls	 NO	 NO	 YES	 YES	
Year	x	region	FE	 YES	 YES	 YES	 YES	
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